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Exploring the Relationship 
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the States and State Regulatory 
Output* 
Stuart Shapiro† and Debra Borie-Holtz†† 
Abstract 
The rhetoric surrounding regulatory reform has long been heated. 
Supporters talk about making regulation more efficient and regulators 
more accountable to the public. Opponents blame regulatory reforms 
for crippling the regulatory process and inhibiting the production of 
regulations that will protect public health. This Article uses a data 
set of regulations and regulatory reforms in twenty-eight states to 
question both of these positions. We find that reforms such as 
executive review of regulations, legislative review of regulations, and 
economic analysis have no relationship with regulatory output. 
Instead, political factors, particularly the control of the state 
legislature, are a much better predictor of the volume of regulation in 
a state. If a legislature passes laws that require regulations, there will 
be more regulations regardless of the procedural hurdles that 
regulatory agencies face when engaging in the regulatory process. 
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Introduction 
The 113th Congress has considered nearly three-dozen bills that 
would change the federal regulatory process.1 The fifty states have 
been extremely active in passing similar bills, particularly since the 
onset of the Great Recession.2 Many of these bills add requirements 
that agencies must follow when promulgating a regulation. These 
bills, often described as “regulatory reforms,” are largely a response to 
claims that regulatory agencies are stifling the economy by 
promulgating too many regulations that kill jobs and hurt the 
economy.  
 
1. Regulatory Studies Ctr., Regulatory Reform Bills, 113th Congress, Geo. 
Wash. U., http://research.columbian.gwu.edu/regulatorystudies/regreform 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Regulatory Studies Ctr.]. 
2. See generally Jason A. Schwartz, Inst. for Pol’y Integrity, 52 
Experiments with Regulatory Review: The Political and 
Economic Inputs into State Rulemakings (2010) (surveying the 
regulatory practices of all 50 states).  
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But do the regulatory reforms work? What does it even mean for 
regulatory reforms to “work”? At the most basic level, we would 
expect regulatory reforms to have a substantive impact on policy 
decisions made by regulating agencies. By raising the cost faced by 
agencies to create regulations, regulatory reforms should also dampen 
the output of regulations. Indeed, opponents of regulatory reforms 
have made this argument repeatedly.3 If these reforms perform neither 
of these functions, then they may serve a political purpose, ensuring 
that political officeholders pay attention to particular regulations that 
create dissatisfaction for affected constituencies.4 Finally, reforms may 
play a symbolic role imbuing the regulatory process with values such 
as public participation, democratic oversight, or economic efficiency. 
Determining which of these roles are played by regulatory reforms 
is increasingly important. As legislators and executives enact more 
and more regulatory reforms, they justify them by arguing that they 
have a substantive impact on regulations or that they will reduce 
regulatory volume.5 This rhetoric is often particularly heated 
regarding environmental regulations. Once put into place, new 
regulatory procedures are rarely repealed. If some regulatory reforms 
are working to curb regulation and others are not, then this will 
inform the debate over new reforms. If they are instead playing only a 
political and/or symbolic role, then this should raise questions about 
their continual appeal. 
In this article, we use a unique data set that contains information 
on the volume of regulation and the varying levels of regulatory 
procedures in twenty-eight states. The states have been underutilized 
in the empirical examination of the regulatory process. Much of the 
extant literature focuses on the federal regulatory process. This 
 
3. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on ‘Deossifying’ the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992) (arguing that 
increasingly burdensome requirements are slowing and rigidifying agency 
rulemaking).  
4. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, 
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. 
Econ. & Org. 243, 244 (1987) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., 
Administrative Procedures]; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & 
Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 
Va. L. Rev. 431, 440–43 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., 
Structure and Process].  
5. See, e.g., Charles S. Clark, House Backs Bill to Rein in Regulations, 
Gov’t Executive, (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.govexec.com/ 
oversight/2013/08/house-backs-bill-rein-regulations/68018/?oref=river 
(explaining that Rep. Sam Graves, R-MO, cited the cost of regulations 
as justification for the REINS Act, which imposes more requirements on 
regulatory agencies).  
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literature raises serious questions about the role of regulatory reforms 
(often called “procedural controls”). However, since there is always 
just one political context at the federal level, determining the 
relationship between politics, procedures, and regulatory output is 
challenging. By looking across twenty-eight states, we hope to cast 
new insight on how regulatory reforms function in practice. 
We find that much of the skepticism about the effectiveness of 
regulatory reform is warranted and much of the rhetoric (on both 
sides of the political spectrum) is overblown. The presence of 
regulatory procedures appears to have no correlation with the volume 
of regulation. Instead, one can predict regulatory volume (and likely 
the content of regulations) much more accurately by seeing who has 
power at any given time. Democratic legislatures pass statutes that 
require more regulations than legislatures controlled by Republicans. 
These regulations then get issued regardless of the procedural 
environment. Regulatory reforms may facilitate control of regulatory 
agencies by existing coalitions of political leaders, but they are 
unlikely necessary to ensure this control. 
This Article will proceed as follows. In the next Part, we review 
both the theoretical claims advanced to explain regulatory reforms 
and the empirical examinations of their actual role. In Part III, we 
describe our data set. We present the analysis of the data from the 
twenty-eight states in Part IV. Finally, in Part V, we ruminate on the 
implications of these findings for future debates on regulatory reform 
and for political control of the administrative state. 
I. The Intent(s) of Regulatory Reform 
The idea of manipulating the regulatory process in order to affect 
regulatory decisions is as old as the administrative state itself.6 The 
Administrative Procedure Act7 was passed in 1946, in part, as a 
response to the growth in power of the executive branch during the 
New Deal.8 The proceduralization of the rulemaking process picked up 
steam as a reaction to the boom in social regulation in the late 1960s 
and 1970s.9 
The procedures put in place for agencies to follow when 
promulgating a regulation were regularly justified with high-minded 
 
6. Marc Allen Eisner, Regulatory Politics in Transition 10 (2d 
ed. 2000).  
7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).  
8. Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Rulemaking: How 
Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy 10–13, 49–50 
(4th ed. 2010). 
9. Eisner, supra note 6, at 118–30. 
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rhetoric and substantive goals. Notice-and-comment rulemaking 
(requiring an agency to publish a proposed rule, accept public 
comments, and respond to those comments) was put in place to 
ensure that bureaucratic decisions would be influenced by public 
input.10 Requirements for presidential or congressional oversight were 
meant to further democratic governance of bureaucratic agencies 
otherwise sheltered from it.11 The demand that agencies perform 
economic analysis on their regulations with large economic impacts 
was accompanied by rhetoric about the need to make regulation more 
efficient.12 Particular interests, especially small businesses, were given 
procedures all their own in order to make up for disadvantages not 
mitigated by other procedures.13 
Those implementing regulatory reforms, however, may have goals 
that are more political than substantive. The idea that procedures put 
in place by legislatures or executives were means of securing lasting 
political influence for the coalition that enacted them was most 
prominently put forth by McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (commonly 
referred to as “McNollgast”).14 They argued that enacting coalitions of 
political actors attempted to ensure that future agency actions 
comported with the enacting coalition’s preference. The political 
actors did so by creating a procedural environment that would 
recreate the interest group environment faced by the enacting 
coalition. Such a procedural environment (called “deck-stacking” by 
McNollgast) would lead to agency decisions that mirrored the 
preferences of the enacting coalition.15 The McNollgast framework was 
expanded upon by numerous scholars.16 Huber and Shipan 
 
10. Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary 
Inquiry 65–66 (1969).  
11. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 
2255, 2332 (2001).  
12. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic Analysis 
Improved Regulatory Decisions?, 22 J. Econ. Persp. 67, 79–80 (2008) 
(arguing that even though the authors found that economic analyses 
have little effect on regulations, such analyses should still be performed 
because of the potential to make more economically efficient policy 
decisions). 
13. Stuart Shapiro, Defragmenting the Regulatory Process, 31 Risk 
Analysis 893, 897–98 (2011). 
14. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 4, at 246. 
15.  Id. at 261–63. 
16. See, e.g., John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan & Madelaine Pfahler, 
Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 
330 (2001); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing 
Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 91 (1994).  
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acknowledge that “scholars seem to agree that the use of procedural 
rather than policy details represents the most important way in which 
congressional majorities use legislation to influence bureaucratic 
autonomy.” 17  
The usefulness of procedural controls as a means of controlling 
bureaucratic discretion has its critics however. Most relevantly, Horn 
and Shepsle argue that such controls limit agency drift (bureaucratic 
preferences that deviate from those of the enacting coalition) by 
empowering future political actors or existing coalitions. These later 
policymakers may have different preferences than the enacting 
coalition, leading to “coalitional drift.” In fact, the existing coalition 
may use the procedural controls put in place by the enacting coalition 
to achieve their own policy goals.18  
Legal scholars have posited another impact and possible intent of 
regulatory reforms. McGarity popularized the theory that regulatory 
procedures, coupled with “hard look” judicial review of agency 
regulations, has ossified the regulatory process.19 Regulatory 
procedures have raised the costs of agency rulemaking to such an 
extent that agencies were avoiding issuing regulations and turning to 
other less burdensome means of setting policy that were free of such 
constraints (such as enforcement actions or guidance documents).20 
McGarity leaves unanswered the question of whether crippling the 
regulatory process is the goal of those implementing regulatory 
reform, but others have made this claim explicit, dubbing the 
phenomena “[p]aralysis by [a]nalysis.”21 
In a study of the notice-and-comment process, West noted the 
work of other scholars who have placed the possible impacts of 
procedures required of agencies issuing regulations into three 
categories.22 Procedures can have the substantive impacts with which 
 
17. John D. Huber & Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion?: 
The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy 35 
(2002). 
18. Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative 
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative 
Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency 
Costs, 75 Va. L. Rev. 499, 501–04 (1989).  
19. McGarity, supra note 3, at 1396–1436. 
20. Id. at 1436–43. 
21. David C. Vladeck & Thomas O. McGarity, Paralysis by Analysis: How 
Conservatives Plan to Kill Popular Regulation, Am. Prospect, Summer 
1995, at 78.  
22. William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, 
Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An 
Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 Pub. Admin. Rev. 66, 67–68 (2004). 
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they are justified (more efficient regulations, greater responsiveness to 
public preferences, favoring particular constituencies).23 Procedures 
can have a political impact facilitating the influence of political 
officeholders24 (although this could be divided into two categories: the 
influence of the enacting coalitions that put the procedures in place25 
or the existing coalition that oversees their use26). Or finally, they can 
have a merely symbolic impact, giving support to the values they are 
said to embody but having little impact on policy.27 
Which of these roles have regulatory reforms played? Once a 
backwater of political science and administrative law research,28 
empirical work on the regulatory process has flowered over the past 
decade. Much of this work has focused on the federal regulatory 
process. There have been examinations of the public comment 
process, the role of cost-benefit analysis, and executive review. Below, 
we briefly summarize the empirical literature that looks at the role 
procedural constraints play in regulatory decision-making.29 After a 
discussion of the various studies of the different constraints on the 
federal regulatory process, we turn to the much sparser literature on 
the regulatory process in the states. 
A. Public Participation 
The area of the regulatory process that has received the most 
attention is the oldest regulatory reform: the notice-and-comment 
process. While participation requirements go as far back as 
regulations, notice-and-comment in its modern form was created by 
the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.30 Agencies are required to 
propose their regulations publicly, provide time for public comment, 
and then respond to the comments in the preamble to their final  
23. Id.  
24.  Id. 
25. See McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 4, at 253–
55 (discussing how politicians can use administrative procedure to affect 
outcomes and induce bureaucratic compliance). 
26. See Horn & Shepsle, supra note 18, at 499 (discussing both the potential 
for bureaucratic drift and “the influence of subsequent political 
coalitions on the development and administration of the law”). 
27. West, supra note 22, at 67–68.  
28. See Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 1111 (2002) (detailing the growing use of empirical 
analysis in administrative law and advocating for its use). 
29. Each of the discussions on the individual procedural controls below is by 
necessity a brief summary. A literature review of each type of procedure 
could take up an article length discussion on its own. 
30. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).  
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rules.31 Courts have required the responses by agencies to be non-
dismissive, but agencies are in no way bound to adopt the suggestions 
of commenters. 
Studies of agency responsiveness to comments have found that 
agencies are likely to respond to comments submitted by the public 
only in certain limited circumstances. Golden found that agencies 
were not likely to modify their proposals except when commenters 
with opposing perspectives agreed on an issue.32 West studied forty-
two rulemakings and concluded that the primary role of the public 
comment process was to highlight issues for political overseers—
confirming, to some degree, the McNollgast view—but even this was 
limited in its impact.33 Yackee concluded that “interest group 
comments can and often do affect the content of final government 
regulations.”34 
One form of participation that has garnered a fair amount of 
academic attention is regulatory negotiation. Reg-neg, as it is often 
called, requires agencies to sit down with the parties affected by a 
regulation and negotiate the contents of the rule. Considerable 
dispute exists about the effectiveness of reg-neg. Advocates of the 
process, such as Harter, argue that the process saves time and reduces 
litigation over regulation.35 Coglianese, in an empirical assessment, 
examined a series of regulatory negotiations and found that the 
purported benefits of the process have not materialized.36 
 
31. Id.  
32. Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: 
Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. Pub. Admin. Res. 
& Theory 245, 259–62 (1998). 
33. West, supra note 22, at 73; see also Steven J. Balla, Administrative 
Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. 
Rev. 663, 671–732 (1998) (concluding that the Health Care Financing 
Administration disfavored comments from the physicians that the 
reform was intended to help).  
34. Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of 
Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. Pub. 
Admin. Res. & Theory 103, 119 (2005). 
35. Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of 
Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 32, 32–45 (2000); Philip 
J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise?, 3 Envtl. 
Impact Assessment Rev. 75, 80–84 (1982). 
36. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance 
of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 Duke L.J. 1255, 1334–36 (1997) (stating 
that the EPA, the agency that has used the process the most, did not 
see time savings and still finds the negotiated rules challenged in court); 
Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A 
Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 386, 445–47 (2001) 
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B. Legislative and Executive Review 
Because of the Supreme Court decision INS v. Chadha,37 which 
overturned the one-house congressional veto, legislative review of 
agency regulatory decisions is nearly non-existent at the federal level. 
The Congressional Review Act was passed in 199638 as a replacement, 
but because it requires a presidential signature, and a president is 
very unlikely to agree to veto a regulation issued by his own 
administration, the CRA has been used only one time. That 
instance—a regulation promulgated at the end of one administration 
with a succeeding Congress and president of the opposing party—will 
very rarely be repeated.39 
Executive review at the federal level is justifiably the subject of 
much more attention. Schultz Bressman and Vandenbergh surveyed 
employees of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and used 
their survey results to argue that review by the president’s staff—
including but not limited to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB)—has been experienced by EPA employees as interference in 
their pursuit of policy goals.40 This agrees with earlier criticisms of 
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) as 
biased in an anti-regulatory direction.41 Most of the criticisms of 
executive oversight, however, are based on individual case studies. 
Justice Kagan, drawing on her experience at the Domestic Policy 
Council under President Clinton, argued that presidential control 
helped in coordination of executive branch activities, and to overcome 
 
(responding to Philip Harter’s criticism of the author’s research and 
further explaining the downsides of negotiated rulemaking).  
37. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
38. Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 251, 110 Stat. 847, 868 (1996) (codified at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012)).  
39. Adam M. Finkel & Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of 
the “Substantially Similar” Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act: 
Can OSHA Ever Utter the E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, 63 Admin. L. 
Rev. 707, 724–30 (2011). 
40. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the 
Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential 
Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 91–99 (2006) (detailing problems with 
transparency, a lack of unification of review, selectivity in the rules 
chosen, poor timing, and a misplaced focus on costs). 
41. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency 
Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 
1059, 1064–71 (1986) (claiming that the system of review “places the 
ultimate rule-making decisions in the hands of OMB personnel” and 
that the “Executive Order allows OMB to cut off all investigations 
before they even begin, making it nearly impossible to attack OMB’s 
decision”). 
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bureaucratic pathologies, such as devotion to mission or torpor.42 
Demuth, a former OIRA Administrator, argues that OIRA’s influence 
has been overstated and that its impact has been minimal.43 The most 
detailed empirical study was by Croley, who examined data on OMB 
review and concluded that the White House used the review process 
to have a greater influence over agency rulemaking, focusing on fewer 
rules over the years while requiring a change in a greater percentage, 
though in an apparently evenhanded way that did not work to the 
advantage of certain types of interests.44  
C. Economic Analysis 
Closely tied (at least on the federal level) to executive review is 
the requirement that federal agencies engage in a form of cost-benefit 
analysis for a certain subsection of their regulations.45 Many agency 
regulatory decisions are also subject to requirements that they 
examine the economic impact of their decision on particular 
constituencies such as small businesses. Opponents of cost-benefit 
analysis have argued that it has weakened regulations, although such 
arguments are usually theoretical rather than empirical.46 Wagner uses 
an EPA analysis to argue that Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs)  
42. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2334–45 (discussing how the Reagan and 
Clinton Administrations adeptly “used their administrative control to 
drive a resistant bureaucracy and political system”). 
43. See Christopher DeMuth, OIRA at Thirty, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 15, 20 
(2011) (stating that “the result of these thirty years of skirmishing has 
been only marginal improvements in regulatory policy”).  
44. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An 
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821, 851, 882–83 (2003) 
(noting that the “Clinton OIRA focused on fewer rules” yet “required a 
change in a much higher percentage of the rules it reviewed” and that 
“the White House clearly has used rulemaking review to put its own 
mark on particular agency rules,” but it has done so in an “evenhanded 
way”). 
45. Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to perform a Regulatory 
Impact Analysis (RIA) on all regulations with an economic impact of 
more than $100 million in any year. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 
638 (1993). 
46. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On 
Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing 8 
(2004) (“The new trend toward economic critique of health and 
environmental protection has caught on in every branch of the federal 
government—within the White House, in Congress, and even in the 
courts. Environmental advocates, decision makers, and citizens 
concerned about the environment often find themselves on the defensive, 
without an effective response to the arcane arguments and imposing 
data offered to show why, when it comes to protective regulation, less is 
better.”). 
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are used to justify regulations more often than influence the policy 
decisions embedded in the regulation.47 This comports with an 
analysis by Shapiro, which argues that the requirement for cost-
benefit analysis, because it is tied to executive review, has always 
taken a back seat to the political needs of the president.48 
Shapiro and Morrall analyzed a series of rules and their 
underlying analyses and found no appreciable relationship between 
the extent of the information provided in the analysis and the net 
benefits of the rule. On the other hand, they found that political 
factors such as the salience of the rule and whether it was a midnight 
regulation did correlate with net benefits. This finding (and the others 
above on cost-benefit analysis) cast doubt on the ability of regulatory 
analysis to have the effects that many proponents expect.49  
D. Deadlines and Delay 
The use of deadlines to constrain bureaucratic discretion has 
received much less attention than other types of regulatory reforms. 
The one significant analysis is by Gersen and O’Connell. They found 
that deadlines do shorten the amount of time it takes to complete a 
rule for an agency but also that deadlines lead to reductions in public 
participation and that agencies frequently miss deadlines—thereby 
calling into question whether the deadlines are effective.50 
The McGarity argument that regulatory reforms and judicial 
review have combined to cripple agency regulators and deter them 
from issuing regulations has recently received increased empirical 
attention.51 McGarity himself relied on a case study of the National 
Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) that indicated 
that the agency had moved away from rulemaking and instead was 
 
47. Wendy E. Wagner, The CAIR RIA: Advocacy Dressed Up as Policy 
Analysis, in RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, Reforming Regulatory 
Impact Analysis 56–82 (Winston Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling & 
Richard D. Morgenstern eds., 2009).  
48. Stuart Shapiro, Unequal Partners: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Executive 
Review of Regulations, 35 Envtl. L. Rep. 10433–44 (2005); see also 
Donald R. Arbuckle, The Role of Analysis on the 17 Most Political 
Acres on the Face of the Earth, 31 Risk Analysis 884–92 (2011).  
49. Stuart Shapiro & John F. Morrall III, The Triumph of Regulatory 
Politics: Benefit–Cost Analysis and Political Salience, 6 Reg. & 
Governance 189 (2012). 
50. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative 
Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 923, 945–46, 956–59 (2008) (discussing how 
deadlines may shorten the length of time needed to complete a proposed 
law, but those effects are sometimes outweighed by the deterrent to 
public participation).  
51. McGarity, supra note 3. 
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relying upon recalls of cars to implement policy.52 Other occasional 
case studies and accounts in the popular press have cited examples of 
regulations that have taken years to complete.53  
Non-academic studies of the numbers of rules and academic 
empirical analyses have been arrayed against the ossification 
argument. In the former category are annual studies by the 
Competitive Enterprise Institute that show that the number of 
regulations issued by the federal government has been steady or even 
increasing despite the increased proceduralization of the regulatory 
process.54 Kerwin and Furlong analyzed EPA regulations and found 
that the time to complete a regulation varied considerably and 
unpredictably.55 More recently, Coglianese cast doubt on the original 
analysis of NHTSA,56 and Johnson argued that ossification has not 
been a problem at EPA.57 In the most detailed analysis of the time it 
takes agencies to complete a rule, Yackee and Yackee showed that for 
a data set composed of rules across agencies, those regulations that 
 
52. Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto 
Safety 165–71 (1990).  
53. See, e.g., Thomas McGarity, Two Years Later, OSHA’s Rule to Protect 
Workers from Deadly Silica Still in White House Review, CPR Blog 
(Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.progressivereform.org/ CPRBlog.cfm? 
idBlog=D913A772-BAB5-697D-6638AEC1CF3053DB (discussing the 
importance of and the length of time to complete the OSHA proposed 
rule “requiring employers in the mining, manufacturing and construction 
industries to protect their employees from silica dust particles as they 
engage in such activities as sandblasting, cutting rocks and concrete, 
and jackhammering”)). 
54. See Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Competitive Enterprise Inst., Ten 
Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the 
Regulatory State 43–45 (2012), available at http://cei.org/sites/ 
default/files/Wayne%20Crews%20-%2010,000%20Commandments% 
202012_0.pdf 2012 (last viewed Feb. 26, 2014) (providing annual 
Federal Register page histories and detailing the number of final and 
proposed rules in each volume). 
55. See generally Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and 
Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theory, 2 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & 
Theory 113, 116 (1992) (discussing the time it takes to complete rules, 
suggesting generally “that the time it takes to write rules is a function 
of variations in both the complexity of the subject matter and the 
effects of legal, bureaucratic, and political variables on the rulemaking 
process”).  
56. Cary Coglianese, Has Judiicial Review Caused a Rulemaking Retreat?, 
Presentation at The Law and Society Conference (May 25, 2009). 
57. Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?: An Empirical Analysis of 
EPA Rulemaking from 2001–2005, 38 Envtl. L. 767 (2008).  
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had to go through certain procedures (such as OIRA review) actually 
were completed more quickly than rules that did not.58 
E. Studies of the States 
The foregoing studies all examine regulation on the federal level. 
There are good reasons that scholars have focused on the federal 
government. Federal regulations have extremely large impacts, with 
some reaching costs and benefits in billions of dollars. The federal 
government has largely been at the forefront of reforming the 
regulatory process with ideas filtering down to the states rather than 
bubbling up from them. And finally, with the Federal Register and 
Unified Agenda online for more than a decade (and public comments 
available through regulations.gov), and regular reports to Congress on 
the impacts of regulation, data on the federal regulatory process has 
been far more plentiful than data in the states. 
But in the past several years, a number of studies of state 
regulations have begun to surface. With a much greater variety of 
regulatory processes and political climates, the states are potentially 
fertile ground for researchers attempting to better understand the 
effect of regulatory procedures. And while federal regulations are 
individually more significant than any state regulation, collectively, 
states regulate twenty percent of the U.S. economy59—arguing for 
better understanding of how state regulations are created. 
Several of the studies echo the results on the federal level that 
cast doubt about the influence of regulatory reforms on regulatory 
decisions. Whisnant and DeWitt Cherry looked at the use of cost-
benefit analysis in North Carolina and raised questions about its 
application there.60 They speculated that limited capacity and 
commitment restricted the ability of states to use analysis to influence 
regulations. Shapiro found that procedural controls had little impact 
on the development of child care licensing standards in eight states.61 
Shapiro and Borie-Holtz, in a case study on regulatory reform in New 
 
58. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures 
and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-Making “Ossified”? 20 
J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 261 (2009). 
59. Paul Teske, Regulation in the States 9 (2004). 
60. Richard Whisnant & Diane DeWitt Cherry, Economic Analysis of 
Rules: Devolution, Evolution, and Realism, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 
693 (1996).  
61. See generally Stuart Shapiro, Speed Bumps and Roadblocks: Procedural 
Controls and Regulatory Change, 12 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 
29 (2002) (discussing how in eight states, the regulation of child care 
was affected much more heavily by interest groups, legislators, and 
executives than by procedural controls).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
Exploring the Relationship Between Regulatory Reform in 
the States and State Regulatory Output 
1804 
Jersey, also found limited effects for many different regulatory 
procedures.62 
On the other hand, Teske argued that “much of the evidence 
here, consistent with the findings of other studies of state regulation, 
demonstrates that government regulatory institutions do shape state 
regulatory policy outcomes in important ways.”63 This is to some 
degree supported by several works relying upon surveys of state 
officials about the perceived influence of the political branches of 
government. Perceived influence is of course distinct from actual 
influence but is still informative. In a 2004 article, Woods found that 
agency officials perceived gubernatorial oversight as more effective 
than legislative review.64 He followed up in a 2005 article showing that 
stronger political branches led to decreased perceptions of interest 
group influence.65 Woods also concluded that provisions broadening 
access and notification to the rulemaking process increased the 
perception of influence of outside actors, particularly the courts and 
interest groups. Also using survey data, Dometrius looked at 
gubernatorial oversight and concluded that oversight (or at least what 
bureaucrats perceived as oversight) was effective when the governor 
had higher approval ratings.66 
Legislative influence has been of particular interest on the state 
level, perhaps because meaningful legislative review is absent on the 
federal level. Teske says that “[l]egislatures play an important role 
when they are directly making regulatory policy themselves or when 
they are overseeing regulatory policies that are largely developed (via 
 
62. Stuart Shapiro & Deborah Borie-Holtz, Lessons from New Jersey: What 
Are the Effects of “Administrative Procedures” Regulatory Reform?, 
Reg. Spring 2011, at 14–19. 
63. Teske, supra note 59, at 29–30. 
64. See Neal D. Woods, Political Influence on Agency Rule Making: 
Examining the Effects of Legislative and Gubernatorial Rule Review 
Powers, 36 St. & Loc. Gov’t Rev. 174, 182 (2004) (concluding that 
“while gubernatorial rule review powers significantly increase the 
reported influence of the governor, all else constant, legislative rule 
review powers do not have a significant effect”).  
65. See Neal D. Woods, Interest Group Influence on State Administrative 
Rule Making: The Impact of Rule Review, 35 Am. Rev. Pub. Admin. 
402, 403 (2005) (concluding that “greater legislative or gubernatorial 
rule review authority will reduce interest group influence by providing 
an institutional means to counteract subsystem politics”).  
66. See Nelson C. Dometrius, Gubernatorial Approval and Administrative 
Influence, 2 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 251, 261 (2002) (concluding that 
“[a] governor’s approval rating does make a difference in how state 
agencies respond to him or her,” improving the effectiveness of 
gubernatorial oversight of rulemaking).  
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rule making) and implemented by state bureaucratic agencies.”67 The 
literature shows mixed results for the impact of legislative review.68 
An article in the Harvard Law Review examined legislative review in 
Connecticut and Alaska and showed that it did result in changes to 
agency regulations.69 Ethridge examined legislative review in three 
states and found that stricter rules were more likely to be reviewed 
(but did not analyze the effect on the reviewed regulations).70 Finally, 
Hahn examined both economic analysis and legislative review. He 
found many requirements but little evidence that the requirements 
had improved regulatory outcomes.71 
The studies above do not give a definitive answer as to whether 
regulatory reforms have substantive impacts, play a role that 
facilitates political oversight, or are largely symbolic.72 However, the 
balance of the studies cast the most severe doubt on the first of these 
three options. Few of the studies above showed procedures having a 
clear impact on policy decisions. Those that did measured the impacts 
as perceived by agency actors rather than changes in policy.73 In what 
follows we try to use a database of regulatory reforms and regulatory 
outputs to help clarify the role of regulatory reforms. First, we should 
describe our data. 
II. Data 
We collected data on all rules issued in 2007 from the twenty-
eight states74 that put data about final regulations online.75 Although  
67. Teske, supra note 59, at 198. 
68  Id. 
69. Note, Oversight and Insight: Legislative Review of Agencies and Lessons 
from the States, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 613, 628, 630 (2007). 
70. Marcus E. Ethridge, A Political-Institutional Interpretation of 
Legislative Oversight Mechanisms and Behavior, 17 Polity 340, 356 
(1984).  
71. Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative 
Analysis, 29 J. Legal Stud. 873, 884 (2000).  
72. West, supra note 22, at 67. 
73. See, e.g., Schultz Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 40, at 99; 
Woods, supra note 64, at 179; Woods, supra note 65, at 408. 
74. Data was collected from twenty-eight states for which regulations were 
available online at the time: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  
75. A natural question is whether states that put their rules online differ in 
some meaningful way from states that do not. As described below, we 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
Exploring the Relationship Between Regulatory Reform in 
the States and State Regulatory Output 
1806 
not a full examination of all fifty states, we tested for discernible bias 
and believe the states we looked at provide a representative sample of 
rulemaking activity in 2007. The final rules we studied were collected 
from states in all four census regions of the country: nine states from 
the Midwest, five states from the Northeast, and seven states each 
from the South and the West regions. Within each region, the Census 
Bureau further stratifies states into divisions, putting two divisions in 
each region, with the exception of the South, which has three regions. 
The data was collected from states in all nine census divisions. Thus, 
while we do not have California, Texas, and Florida in our database, 
the states we did examine are a representative sample of the nation as 
a whole. 
The states are also representative politically. The state legislature 
was governed by Democrats in eleven of the states in 2007, by 
Republicans in eight, and was split between the two parties in nine of 
the states in our data set. It was more lopsided in the governor’s 
mansion where twenty-one of the twenty-eight states were governed 
by Democrats (the 2006 elections swept Democrats into statehouses 
nationwide). Eleven of the states voted for John Kerry for President 
in 2004 and seventeen of them voted for George W. Bush. 
Finally, as for our key independent variable, the presence of 
procedures to control agency regulatory actions, our states represent 
an excellent cross section. As described below, in the discussions of 
the three key regulatory reforms, executive control of rulemaking, 
legislative control of rulemaking, and economic analysis requirements, 
all three variables have scores across our entire spectrum for the 
stringency of the control.76 
A. Dependent Variable—How Many Rules? 
Regulatory output is not a perfect proxy for the impact of 
regulations. However, there are a number of characteristics that make 
it a useful dependent variable. First, a central claim of those opposing 
regulatory reforms is that such reforms make it harder to regulate.77 If 
the cost of writing a regulation has risen for agencies, then it follows 
that fewer regulations will be produced (unless agency resources are 
increasing but those cases are few and far between). Therefore, 
 
tested for discernible bias and could not find any meaningful differences 
between states in our sample and states not in it. 
76. One possible difficulty is the existing regulatory base in the states. Some 
states may issue more regulations because they have issued fewer 
regulations in the past and are merely “catching up” with their peers. 
While we do not think this is the case, it is extremely difficult to test 
and therefore to rule out. 
77. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 3, at 1398. 
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examining the effect of regulatory reforms on regulatory output 
provides a direct test of the argument that reform dampens output 
and one side of the argument that reforms have a substantive impact 
on regulation. 
As for the other side of the argument—whether reforms lead to 
more effective regulations—the connection between output and 
impact is less strong but still viable. Critics of regulation often cite 
the number of regulations and conflate it with regulatory stringency 
in the public mind and in political rhetoric.78 Moreover, most 
regulations do impose a constraint on private action and hence the 
volume of regulatory activity has often served as a proxy for 
regulatory burden.79 In addition, we find a statistically significant 
reverse correlation (-0.37) between the number of regulations in a 
state and the “regulatory freedom” in that state as measured by 
Sorens and Ruger.80 This indicates that having more regulations does 
correlate with regulatory stringency and hence has some validity as a 
measure of stringency. The relationship between the volume of 
rulemaking and the stringency is unlikely to be perfect but it also 
strikes us that these two variables are likely to be related (more 
regulations are likely to indicate a more stringent regulatory regime).81  
While we report the total number of rules (8961 rules in the 
twenty-eight states), this measure does not serve well as a dependent 
variable for state regulatory activity. States use rulemaking in 
different ways. For example, most states use rulemaking to administer 
their Medicaid program, with some states issuing more than fifty 
 
78. Crews, supra note 54, at 40. 
79. Indeed, rulemaking output at the federal level tends to increase in 
Democratic administrations and decrease in Republican administrations. 
This has so far not held for the Obama Administration. Id. at 39. 
Rulemaking output also increases in the last year of an administration 
when agencies tend to promulgate costly rules. See Jack M. Beermann, 
Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 352, 
352 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/ 
2009/9/LRColl2009n9Beermann.pdf.  
80. William P. Ruger & Jason Sorens, Freedom in the 50 States 2013: Index 
of Personal and Economic Freedom, STATEPOLICYINDEX, http:// 
www.statepolicyindex.com/freedom-in-the-50-states/ (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2013). 
81. Recent work by Michael Mandel and Diana G. Carew has argued that 
the sheer number of regulations may have important deleterious effects 
apart from the impact of any individual regulation. Michael Mandel & 
Diana G. Carew, Regulatory Improvement Commission: A 
Politically-Viable Approach to U.S. Regulatory Reform 3–9 
(2013), available at http://www.progressivepolicy.org/2013/05/ 
regulatory-improvement-commission-a-politically-viable-approach-to-u-s-
regulatory-reform/. 
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“Medicaid rules” in 2007. However, some states do not use rulemaking 
for Medicaid, meaning that the total number of rules means different 
things in different states.  
To deal with this problem, we borrowed a concept from the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs. We separated out rules with a 
real economic impact on society from “budgetary” rules that govern 
programs, like Medicaid, which merely disburse funds. We also 
eliminated rules that set the hunting season for various animals, 
because the extent to which states use rulemaking for this purpose 
varies considerably between states. Finally we also eliminated purely 
administrative regulations that set rules for the state government, not 
the public. This left us with a variable we called “economic rules,” or 
rules that impose an economic constraint on private action, which 
totaled 5356 rules for the twenty-eight states. The total for each state 
is in Table 1. This reflects a more adequate measure of the regulatory 
activity in each state in 2007. 
We note that our “economic rules” variable incorporates what 
scholars of regulation call “social regulations” (regulations designed to 
curb externalities or information asymmetries in order to improve 
public health) as well as “economic regulations” (regulations that 
restrict the price or quantity of goods or services). Both of these types 
of regulations restrict private behavior and hence have an  
economic effect. 
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Table 1: Rules per State in 2007 
State 
2007 
Total Rules 
Rules with an 
Economic Impact 
Arizona 145 93 
Arkansas 298 131 
Delaware 191 140 
Idaho 229 145 
Illinois 381 183 
Indiana 218 85 
Iowa 463 254 
Kansas 113 62 
Louisiana 542 219 
Maine 418 246 
Michigan 64 58 
Minnesota 72 36 
Missouri 184 126 
Montana 160 70 
Nevada 674 562 
New Hampshire 324 197 
New Jersey 474 371 
New Mexico 546 319 
New York 681 514 
North Carolina 152 110 
Oklahoma 508 274 
Pennsylvania 77 44 
South Dakota 78 45 
Tennessee 281 172 
Virginia 367 237 
Washington 993 484 
Wisconsin 134 99 
Wyoming 194 80 
TOTAL 8961 5356 
 
While the procedures that we examine affect all regulations issued 
in a state, there is reason to believe that they will act differently in 
different policy areas. The politics surrounding an issue vary by policy 
area and, therefore, the role of regulatory reforms and of political 
actors may vary.82 The very nature of certain procedures may lead to 
 
82. See generally, The Politics of Regulation (James Q. Wilson ed., 
1980) (discussing different areas in which the government regulates). 
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different impacts in different policy areas. Cost-benefit analysis is 
harder or easier depending on the nature of the question being 
analyzed. Deadlines are more relevant when the policy question being 
answered is more complicated. 
There were five policy areas that were common to the vast 
majority of states we examined. These policy areas also made up a 
significant portion of total number of economic regulations that we 
used as our aggregate dependent variable. The five policy areas are 
environment, transportation, agriculture, insurance and banking, and 
education. For each of the analyses conducted below, we report the 
results in aggregate and then note if there are any differences in the 
five policy areas. If there is no mention of the specific policy areas, 
then the results were the same as the aggregate results. 
B. Independent Variables: Procedural Controls 
If there is no relationship between the presence of procedures and 
the level of regulatory output, then do other factors in the political 
environment explain regulatory output at the states? Horn and 
Shepsle argued that coalitions that put procedures in place to control 
bureaucratic drift leave themselves open to changes in who holds the 
political reins or “coalitional drift.”83 Are existing coalitions able to 
enforce their will over state agencies, regardless of the procedural 
environment in which they operate? 
We collected data on the regulatory process for each state, 
including data on executive and legislative review, requirements for 
impact analyses, rulemaking deadlines, and sunset provisions.84 During 
our data collection process, the Institute for Policy Integrity (IPI) 
issued a detailed report on the role of executive and legislative review, 
impact analysis, and sunset provisions in the states. The IPI report 
was based on data collection and interviews in all fifty states. For 
each procedural requirement that they studied, they compared the 
legal requirements with the practice in each state.85 This data was far 
more extensive than anything previously available and became the 
primary source for our data on these regulatory reforms. 
For legislative review, executive review, and impact analysis, we 
developed ten-point scales for the extent of the reach of each 
procedure in each state in our database. The ten-point scale for each 
 
83. Horn & Shepsle, supra note 18, at 502–04. 
84. Because each state requires a public comment period, there was little 
data to collect on this aspect of rulemaking. We did collect data on 
whether states require agencies to respond to comment but, as described 
below, found no significant relationship between that requirement and 
regulatory output. 
85. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 146–395. 
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of these variables is detailed in the Appendix. The scores were based 
on the descriptions in the IPI report.86 Several scales on legislative 
review had been developed (prior to the issuance of the IPI report). 
Our scale has a correlation coefficient of 0.62 with Gerber, Maestas, 
and Dometrius’ scale87 and a correlation coefficient of 0.63 with the 
scale developed by Grady and Simon.88 These correlation coefficients 
indicate that our legislative review scale possesses external validity. 
Agreement with the executive review scale developed by Grady 
and Simon was less strong with a correlation coefficient of 0.47. This 
value is still statistically significant (using a two-tailed t-test at the 
five percent confidence level). Further, detail on executive review 
before the IPI report was harder to access because much of it is 
informal (as opposed to legislative review, which is often in statute), 
so we believe our data (really, IPI’s data) on executive review is the 
best available. We also collected dichotomous data on whether or not 
states require a written response to agency comments,89 whether 
agencies sunset their rules, and whether they place a deadline  
on rulemaking. 
C. Independent Variables: Politics  
We collected data on political variables in each state in an effort 
to control for differences in political preferences for regulation. First, 
we measured for differences in political culture, which was defined by 
the general election vote for president in the 2004 cycle. We also 
collected data on the partisan control of the governor’s office and 
both chambers of the legislature in 2007 and further noted those 
instances where control of the legislature was divided. With the 
exception of two states, New Jersey and Virginia, state legislatures 
elect their members in even numbered years; therefore, the 2007 
legislature was the first year of a new session for most states. Given 
the likelihood that some rules finalized in 2007 resulted from 
lawmaking in the prior session, we also took a look at partisan control 
in 2006. While individual members may have changed, the partisan 
make-up of the states changed only slightly in 2007 as compared to  
86. Id. at 91–141. 
87. Brian J. Gerber et al., State Legislative Influence over Agency 
Rulemaking: The Utility of Ex Ante Review, 5 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 24 
(2005). 
88. Dennis O. Grady & Kathleen M. Simon, Political Restraints and 
Bureaucratic Discretion: The Case of State Government Rule Making, 
30 POL. & POL’Y 646 (2002). 
89. All states require public comment, so there is no variation in this 
requirement, which makes it impossible to use as an independent 
variable. How well states respond to comment may vary, but collecting 
that data for this volume of regulations is impossible. 
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2006. In six states, the partisan control shifted from a single party 
control to split control;90 only New Hampshire shifted from 
Republican control in 2006 to Democratic control in 2007. 
III. Analysis 
This section is broken up by the categories of independent 
variables. First, we discuss the role of procedures in regulatory 
output, and then the role of politics. With a sample size of twenty-
eight states, our ability to use multiple independent variables is 
limited. After the comparisons of individual variables, a third 
subsection below includes some simple multivariable analyses. Given 
the limited number of correlations found in the first two sections, the 
likelihood that significant relationships would be found in a 
multivariate analysis is limited.  
A. Administrative Procedures 
The twenty-eight states we examined provide considerable 
variation in their use of regulatory procedures, which allows for an 
examination of their effects that extends beyond what scholars have 
studied previously. In this Part, we describe the interaction between 
six types of procedures and rulemaking output. As described above, 
three of these variables are constructed as a ten-point scale: executive 
review, legislative review, and economic analysis. The other three 
variables are yes/no variables: sunset requirements, deadlines for 
finalizing rules, and the requirement that agencies respond  
to comments.  
B. Executive Review 
As described in the Appendix, the ten-point scale for the 
executive review variable is made up of four components. These four 
are (1) whether the review is required or optional, (2) whether it is 
binding or non-binding, (3) who conducts the review (the governor’s 
office or another office in the executive branch), and (4) the criteria 
for the review. The average score for the twenty-eight states is a 5.5 
and the median score is a six. There was considerable clustering near 
the ends of the scale, with ten states receiving a zero and six states 
receiving a ten. 
The correlation coefficient for the total number of rules, for the 
number of economic rules, and for the number of rules in each of the 
 
90. Of the six states that saw party shifts in the legislative chambers, 
Indiana, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin went from Republican 
control in 2006 to split partisan leadership of the chambers in 2007. 
Iowa and Minnesota went from Democratic control in 2006 to split 
control in 2007. 
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five policy areas, with the level of executive review was negative but 
small and statistically insignificant91 (-0.19 and -0.16 respectively for 
total rules and economic rules). The negative correlation is expected 
as executive review is criticized as one of the procedures that often 
deters rulemaking. The small magnitude and statistical insignificance 
of the relationship seems to indicate that, by itself, executive review 
does not dissuade agencies from engaging in rulemaking. 
However, if one examines the six states that scored a ten in the 
Executive Review variable,92 a possible relationship emerges. The 
average number of economic rules in these six states was ninety-eight 
rules, but the average for the other twenty-two states was 216 rules 
(breaking out the ten states that scored zero showed no relationship 
with the level of rulemaking). This difference was statistically 
significant at the five percent level93 using a one-sided t-test and may 
show that, in its most extreme forms, executive review has an impact 
on the level of rulemaking. However, we should note that of these six 
states, three had Republican governors and two of the other three had 
legislatures controlled by Republicans. This may indicate that existing 
coalition control provides a more compelling explanation for 
rulemaking volume.  
C. Legislative Review 
Like the executive review variable, the ten-point scale for the 
legislative review variable has several components. Review is 
considered more stringent if it is mandatory instead of voluntary, if 
legislatures actually have veto authority (without requiring a 
governor’s signature), and if there are fewer restrictions on the legal 
grounds for legislative disapproval of a regulation. The average review 
score is a 5.5 and the median is a five. There are fewer extreme values 
for this variable than for the executive review variable, with only 
three states with a value of zero94 and two states with a  
“perfect” ten.95 
The strength of legislative review has no correlation with the 
volume of rulemaking in the state. Correlation coefficients were close 
to zero for both total rules and economic rules. This was also true for 
each of the five policy areas we examined. Six out of thirteen states  
91. Using a one sided t-test. 
92. The states are Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Pennsylvania. 
93. While the direction was the same for each policy area, the relationship 
was statistically significant for transportation regulation and 
insurance/banking regulation only. 
94. The three states are Arizona, New Mexico, and Delaware. 
95. These two are Tennessee and Illinois. 
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with a legislative review score below the median issued more than the 
median number of rules in 2007, while six out of fifteen states at or 
above the median level of legislative review issued more than the 
median number of rules. 
D. Impact Analysis 
The final of our three variables with a ten-point scale was the 
stringency of impact analysis requirements in the states. States 
received a higher score based on the number of rules for which 
analysis was required (intermediate scores were given for states that 
had a threshold for requiring analysis), for requiring analysis of all 
costs and benefits instead of just government impacts, and for the 
type and extent of review of the analysis. The mean and median 
scores were both six, and three states scored a zero,96 while four states 
scored a ten.97  
Like legislative review, economic analysis shows no relationship 
with the volume of rulemaking. The correlation coefficients for total 
number of rules, rules with an economic effect, and rules in all five 
policy areas are all nearly zero, and the level of rulemaking for states 
with below- and above-the-median analysis scores are virtually 
identical. It appears that both economic analysis and legislative 
review have no relationship with the number of rules that agencies 
promulgate. 
E. Other Procedures 
All of the states have some form of notice and comment. Only ten 
of the twenty-eight states in the study require that agencies actually 
publish responses to agency comments. We hypothesized that 
requiring an agency response might deter rulemaking but actually 
found no statistically significant relationship. For both the total 
number of rules and economic rules, more rules were promulgated in 
the ten states with required agency responses than in the eighteen 
states that allowed agencies to publish final rules without a response. 
The difference is small and not statistically significant, however. 
A number of states require agencies to finalize their rules within a 
certain period of time after the close of the public comment period. 
Sixteen states (out of our twenty-eight) have such deadlines, and the 
deadlines vary from seventy-five days after the end of public 
comments to two years after the comment period is concluded. 
Theoretically, such deadlines should cut down on the number of final 
 
96. Delaware, New Mexico, and Wyoming have no economic analysis of 
regulations. 
97. New York, Virginia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania all received scores of 
ten. 
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rules because agencies may not be able to finalize all of their 
proposals within the prescribed time limits. 
Indeed, this is one procedural control that works just as predicted. 
States with rulemaking completion deadlines promulgated an average 
of 233 rules and 139 economic rules. States without a deadline 
promulgated an average of 432 rules and 265 economic rules. The 
differences are statistically significant for both variables at the five 
percent level. While all five policy areas showed higher levels of 
rulemaking in states without deadlines, the relationship was 
statistically significant in Education and Agriculture but not in the 
other three areas. Still, this is the clearest impact of any 
administrative procedure. Placing a deadline on the completion of 
agency rulemaking following a proposed rule results in fewer  
final rules.  
The final procedure we examined was a sunset provision. States 
with sunset provisions issue more rules than states without them. 
However, this may be because states with sunset provisions have to 
undertake rulemaking to re-promulgate sunsetting rules. This alone 
could drive up the level of rulemaking in these states. 
Overall, looking at the relationship between a single regulatory 
reform and the number of economic regulations adopted in these 
twenty-eight states, only the requirement of a deadline for completion 
showed a moderate to strong and statistically significant relationship. 
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Table 2. Correlations among Economic Rules and Regulatory 
Reforms  
 
Number of Economic Rules (n=28 states) 
Oversight & Analysis Correlation p Value
Executive Review –0.256 0.189
Legislative Review 0.100 0.613
Fiscal Oversight –0.136 0.491
Time Deadlines –0.465* 0.013
Sunset Provision 0.181 
0.357
Response to Comments 0.295 
0.128
Total Scale  –0.181 –0.181
 Note: p value is a two-tailed test. 
 * Significant at 5% level of statistical significance 
 
F. Political Variables 
If enacting coalitions can have only very limited effects on future 
agency actions through procedural controls, what about existing 
coalitions? We compared the party control of the governor’s office and 
the legislature to the level of regulatory output. The clearest impact 
was control of the legislature. We collected data on legislative control 
in both 2006 and 2007 because, conceivably, agencies could be 
engaging in rulemaking to implement statutes passed either by the 
current legislature or the previous one. Democratic control of the 
legislature correlates with rulemaking volume regardless of the session 
of the legislature as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Legislative Control and Regulatory Output 
 
2006  
Party 
Control of 
Legislature 
2006 
Average 
No. of 
Rules 
2006  
Average 
No. of 
Economic 
Rules 
2007  
Party 
Control of 
Legislature
2006 
Average 
No. of 
Rules 
2007  
Average 
No. of 
Economic 
Rules 
D (8) 475 258 D (11) 424 231 
S (7) 360 250 S (9) 323 219 
R (13) 203 119 R (8) 173 104 
 
 
This speaks volumes to the issue of existing coalition power in 
state rulemaking. Democratic control of state legislatures likely 
compels rulemaking from agencies more often than Republican 
control. Note, we are not measuring whether the substance of the 
rules comports with the intent of the legislature. Even without this 
data, the level of rulemaking output is highly suggestive of existing 
coalition control. 
The difference between Democratic and Republican control is 
statistically significant at the five percent level (using a one-sided t-
test for a difference between the mean number of rules in Democratic 
states and Republican states) for legislative control in both 2006 and 
2007, and for both total number of rules and for economic rules. If one 
includes the cases where control of the legislature was split with those 
where Republicans were in control (in effect arguing that control of 
one house of the legislature is enough to prevent the passage of 
statutes that require regulation), the difference in total rules between 
Democratic-controlled legislatures (in 2006 and 2007) and all other 
legislatures is statistically significant (again using a one-sided t-test), 
but not the difference in economic rules. 
All five policy areas exhibited higher levels of regulation under 
Democratic-controlled legislatures (both 2006 and 2007) than in 
Republican-controlled legislatures. The difference between states with 
Democratic and Republican legislatures was statistically significant 
for environment, education, and insurance/banking, but not for 
transportation or agriculture. If one includes the split legislatures on 
either side, the statistical significance disappears in all policy areas. 
Why might legislative control be so important in determining 
regulatory volume? Regulations have their genesis in laws that 
authorize them. Laws are of course the creation of state legislatures. 
These results indicate that the control of these legislatures is a 
significant determinant of regulatory volume. Democratic legislatures 
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are more likely to pass regulatory laws and hence more likely to have 
agencies that produce high volumes of regulation.  
Interestingly, party control of the governor’s office has little 
relationship to the level of rulemaking output. The twenty-one states 
with Democratic governors in 2007 issued an average of 310 rules 
(with 184 economic rules) compared to 350 (212 economic rules) for 
the seven states with Republican governors. The difference is not 
statistically significant. 
G. Combinations of Variables 
One could come up with a large number of hypotheses about how 
combinations of the variables described above could affect rulemaking 
output. While our sample size is too small to run regressions with 
large numbers of independent variables and get meaningful results, we 
can look in detail at combinations of two or three variables. Even 
restricting ourselves to such combinations leaves many possibilities, 
however. We decided to focus on two types of combinations. First, we 
examined whether procedural controls operating together deterred 
rulemaking, a claim often voiced by opponents of such procedures.98 
Second, we examined party control of the legislature in combination 
with legislative review, and party control of the governor’s mansion 
with executive review to see if we could shed any light on the 
particular impacts of these controls. 
H. Combinations of Procedures 
The simplest way to examine the impact of the three main 
procedures studied (legislative review, executive review, and economic 
analysis) is to add them together. Since all three procedural variables 
were given a zero-to-ten scale, adding them together weights them 
equally. The correlation between the number of rules (total and 
economic) and the combined score for the three procedures is not 
statistically significant, casting further doubts on the argument that 
procedures deter rulemaking. 
We then examined the various combinations of the three controls 
to see if any particular combination shows an impact on rulemaking. 
Table 4 shows the eight possible combinations (with the median for 
each procedural score used to differentiate between states that use the 
procedure and states that do not). 
  
 
98. See, e.g., Vladeck & McGarity, supra note 21, at 78. 
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Table 4. Aggregate State Totals by Analysis Scores 
 
Fiscal 
Analysis 
Score (Score 
Above 6) 
Executive Review 
Score (Score 
Above 6) 
Legislative 
Review (Score 
Above 5) 
Average Number 
of Economic 
Rules (and no. of 
states with 
> median no. of 
economic rules) 
Below Below Below 235 
(2/3 above) 
Below Below Above 212 
(2/7 above) 
Below Above Below 91 
(0/2 above) 
Below Above Above 167 
(1 of 2 above) 
Above Below Below 306 
(2 of 3 above) 
Above Below Above 197 
(1 of 1 above) 
Above Above Below 197 
(2 of 5 above) 
Above Above Above 108 
(1 of 5 above) 
 
The most striking result in Table 4 is that the two highest 
average regulatory outputs occur in the states with scores for 
executive and legislative review that are below the median and two of 
the three lowest outputs occur where they are both above the median. 
The sample sizes are small, so appropriate caution should be taken 
here. No discernible pattern emerges regarding the use of economic 
analysis in combination with the other controls. 
We also tested the relationship between rulemaking output and 
the combination of deadlines and other controls. It is possible that 
deadlines are more of a constraint when agencies have to complete 
analyses and go through executive or legislative review as part of the 
regulatory process. We found a statistically significant difference (at 
the five percent level using a one-sided t-test) between the mean 
number of economic rules in states with stringent executive review 
and a deadline and states without stringent executive review or a 
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deadline.99 States with a deadline and executive review produced fewer 
economic rules (92) than deadline states with a deadline and lax 
executive review (185). Legislative review and analysis showed 
differences in the same direction but did not rise to the level of 
statistical significance.  
I. Politics and Procedures 
Our final examination of this data involved combinations of the 
procedural control variables and political control of the branches of 
government.100 First we looked at executive review in combination 
with the party of the sitting governor. The results are in Table 5. 
  
 
99. This relationship is also statistically significant for insurance/banking, 
education, and transportation. States with deadlines and stringent 
executive review also produce fewer environmental and agriculture 
regulations than states with deadlines and lax review, but the 
relationship is not statistically significant. See supra Table 4. 
100. We also tested control of the executive and legislative branches in 
combination. We found no statistically significant results of interest, 
including no difference between divided government and unified 
government. See infra Table 5. 
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Table 5. Gubernatorial Party Control and Executive Review 
 
Party Control Executive Review 
Score 
(Score Above 6) 
Average No. of 
Economic + Licensing 
Regulations 
(and no. of states with 
> median no. of 
economic rules) 
D Below 209 
(5/10 above average)
D Above 162 
(4/11 above average)
R Below 304 
(2/4 above but 2 
highest) 
R Above 89
(0/3 above average) 
 
The result in the last line is the most interesting. While executive 
review by itself seems to show an impact on regulatory output only 
when it is at an extreme level (see discussion above), there does seem 
to be an important interaction with political control of the  
governor’s office. 
Specifically, in the three states where a Republican is governor 
and there is stringent executive review, a far smaller number of 
regulations with an economic impact are issued. This difference is 
statistically significant using a one-sided t-test, when comparing these 
states with the remaining twenty-five states (at the one percent level) 
or with the four states with Republican governors and no executive 
review (at the ten percent level). It is possible that executive review 
makes little difference if there is a Democratic governor, but that a 
Republican governor can use it to stifle regulation.  
The situation looks similar but with some important differences 
when one examines the individual policy areas. Table 6 reproduces 
Table 5 by policy area. Each cell contains the average number of rules 
in that policy area. 
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Table 6. Gubernatorial Party Control and Executive Review 
by Policy Area 
 
Party Control D D R R 
Executive Review 
Score (Indicates 
Score 
Above/Below 6) 
 
Below 6 
 
Above 6 
 
Below 6 
 
Above 6 
Environment 30 22 27 24 
Agriculture 13 7 13 24 
Insurance/Banking 16 11 18 8 
Education 26 18 34 3 
Transportation 7 6 21 8 
 
As with the aggregate data, three of the five policy areas show the 
lowest volume of rulemaking when a Republican is governor and there 
is stringent executive review.101 The opposite situation holds for 
agriculture, but there is only one state in this category for which we 
were able gather data on agricultural rulemaking. Interestingly, 
environmental rules, often seen as the most contentious area of 
regulation, show no relationship with this combination of 
gubernatorial variables. 
We also examined legislative review in conjunction with party 
control of the legislature. The data is in Table 7. 
  
 
101. For education, the difference between the last row of the table and the 
other rows is significant at the five percent level using a one-sided t-test. 
For insurance/banking, it is significant at the ten percent level. See 
supra Table 6.  
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Table 7. Legislative Review and Legislative Control  
 
Party 
Control 
(2007) 
Legislative Review 
Score (Score Above 
5) 
Average No. of 
Economic + Licensing Regulations 
(and no. of states with > median 
no. of economic rules) 
D Below 355
(4/4 above) 
D Above 161 
(3/7 above) 
R Below 167 
(2/8 above) 
R Above 169 
(2/9 above) 
 
Here the difference occurs on the other end of the spectrum. 
States in which Democrats control the legislature and there is weak 
legislative review tend to have a higher number of regulations. The 
difference between this group and the combination of the other three 
groups is significant using a one-sided t-test at the five percent level. 
Four of the five individual policy areas show the same pattern of 
highest rulemaking volume when Democrats control the legislature 
and legislative review is limited. The difference rises to statistical 
significance, however, only for insurance/banking. 
It appears that review by legislatures and executives may make a 
difference in regulatory output, but only if the existing coalition uses 
the review function. On the executive side, this means that executive 
review makes it easier for a Republican governor to dull regulatory 
output. Executive review may be helpful but not sufficient to deter 
rulemaking. On the legislative side this means that regulatory output 
could be restrained either by strong legislative review or by having a 
legislature controlled by Republicans. Legislative review may be 
sufficient but is not necessary to deter regulation. 
Conclusion: Does Regulatory Reform Matter? 
A great deal of rhetoric has gone into the debate over regulatory 
reform. When new regulatory reforms are passed, tax dollars must be 
spent implementing them. And proponents and opponents of 
regulatory reform certainly seem to believe that regulatory reforms 
matter a great deal; their passage regularly cheers those who believe 
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regulations are costly102 and bureaucrats are “out of control,” and 
instills fear in those who believe that regulations are necessary to 
protect public health and that agency experts should be allowed to 
conduct their business unburdened by excessive political oversight.103 
At the federal level, numerous academic studies have raised 
questions about the efficacy of changes to the regulatory process.104 
Furthermore the continual demand for more regulatory reforms (the 
113th Congress is considering twenty-three such bills as this Article is 
being written)105 should provide evidence that the existing procedures 
in place are not doing their job (why pass more regulatory reforms if 
the ones already in place are effective?). But, the federal government 
is essentially a single case study. The performance of regulatory 
reform at the federal level is suggestive but not necessarily 
generalizable. The fifty states provide a much broader spectrum in 
which to analyze the performance of regulatory reforms. 
The data presented above from the states suggest that regulatory 
reforms do not fulfill the hopes of their advocates or realize the fears 
of their opponents. With one notable exception (deadlines to finalize a 
proposed rule), there appears to be little relationship between the 
presence of most reforms and the volume of rulemaking in the state. 
While volume is an imperfect measure of regulatory policy, the lack of 
a relationship contradicts the argument that regulatory procedures 
dampen output and casts doubt on the argument that such 
procedures will have a predictable substantive impact on future 
regulatory policy. 
Using West’s typology of the roles of regulatory procedures106 the 
data presented here would suggest that that regulatory reforms are 
unlikely to have substantive effects. Do they instead play a symbolic 
 
102. See, e.g., David Herszenhorn, DeMint Wants Law to Rein in 
Regulations, CAUCUS, (Sept. 22, 2010, 4:37 PM), http://thecaucus. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/22/demint-wants-law-to-rein-in-regulations/ 
(noting that the Reins Act would “put a stop to the reckless and costly 
anti-free market regulations that are destroying jobs”). 
103. See, e.g., Noah M. Sachs, When It REINS, It Pours, New Republic 
(Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/83195/ 
reins-act-congress-veto-gop (arguing that “U.S. administrative law has 
operated from the premise that agency action should be somewhat 
insulated from political pressure and horse trading” and that upsetting 
that balance would “do serious damage to American health and 
prosperity—stopping agencies from promulgating important rules that, 
among other things, would help prevent bank failures [and] ensure the 
safety of the food we eat”). 
104. See supra notes 22–58 and accompanying text. 
105. Regulatory Studies Ctr., supra note 1. 
106. West, supra note 22.  
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or a political role? The data here does not speak definitively to this 
question, but it provides some tantalizing clues. Executive review 
appears as if it can be used by governors who are opposed to 
regulation to facilitate the dampening of regulatory output. 
Legislative review can be used similarly. Economic analysis appears to 
play a largely symbolic role. 
But it is crucial to note that executive and legislative review at 
most facilitate control by those in power, not by those who enact 
them. In the words of Horn and Shepsle,107 these controls are subject 
to coalitional drift. Thus, while they play a role in facilitating political 
oversight of regulatory agencies, that role is not predictable in its 
substantive direction. Governors who favor regulation may use 
executive review to enact their preferences. The same is true for 
legislators and legislative review. 
Several scholars have noted that other powers possessed by the 
executive and the legislature, such as budgetary control and the 
appointment power, can be used quite effectively to control agency 
outputs.108 If this is true, then regulatory reforms are little more than 
a luxury for executives and legislatures looking to control executive 
branch agencies. They are another arrow in a relatively full quiver of 
mechanisms of control, not the solution to a perceived problem of 
agencies issuing regulations willy-nilly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
107. Horn & Shepsle, supra note 18, at 499. 
108. See George A. Krause, Federal Reserve Policy Decision Making: 
Political and Bureaucratic Influences, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 124 (1994); B. 
Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political-
Bureaucratic Adaptation, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 497 (1993); B. Dan Wood 
& Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801 (1991). 
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Appendix 
Scales for Legislative Review, Executive Review, and Impact Analysis 
Executive Review
Who conducts the review? 
No one (0) 
Within agency only (1) 
Outside agency if triggered (2) 
Mandatory outside agency (3) 
 
Is review binding? 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
 
Who is the outside reviewer? 
No one (0) 
AG or independent agency (1) 
Governor’s office (2) 
 
Criteria for review? 
1 point for each for: 
 Procedural 
 Legality 
 Economic 
 Others 
Legislative Review 
Nature of review 
None (0) 
Some regulations (1) 
All regulations (2) 
 
Nature of oversight 
None (0) 
Advisory (1) 
Need full vote in both chambers to overturn (2) 
Need full vote in one chamber to overturn (3) 
Committee can overturn (4) 
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Criteria for review 
None (0) 
Violates state Administrative Procedure Act (1) 
Other legal problem or conflict (2) 
Impact on certain communities (3) 
Any policy reason (4) 
Impact Analysis 
When is analysis done? 
None (0) 
If requested by legislature or governor (1) 
If requested by public (2) 
If $ threshold for effect on budget (3) 
If $ threshold for effect on economy (4) 
All regulations (5) 
 
Types of impact analyzed 
None (0) 
On governments (1) 
On private sector (2) 
 
Who reviews analysis? 
Within agency (0) 
Independent review (1) 
 
Scope of review 
None (0) 
Minimal (1) 
Comprehensive (2) 
  
 
